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Robes and Rehabilitation:
How Judges Can Help Offenders “Make Good”
David B. Wexler

J

ust over a year ago, Court Review devoted a special issue
to the topic of therapeutic jurisprudence (often called,
simply, TJ).1 Judge William Schma, a leading judicial
voice in therapeutic jurisprudence, introduced the issue in an
essay titled “Judging for the New Millennium.”2
Judge Schma noted that “it is important for judges to practice TJ because—like it or not—the law does have therapeutic
and anti-therapeutic consequences.”3 In other words, judges
are increasingly recognizing that the choice is indeed either to
be part of the solution or, instead, to in essence be part of the
problem—of “revolving door” justice and the like.
In fact, in August 2000, the Conference of Chief Justices
and the Conference of State Court Administrators, in a joint
resolution, endorsed the notion of problem-solving courts and
calendars that utilize the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence.4 The resolution noted that well-functioning drug treatment courts5 represent the best practice of these principles.
Regarding therapeutic jurisprudence specifically, the resolution states:
There are principles and methods founded in therapeutic jurisprudence, including integration of treatment services with judicial case processing, ongoing
judicial intervention, close monitoring of and
immediate response to behavior, multi-disciplinary
involvement, and collaboration with community
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based and government organizations. These principles and methods are now being employed in these
newly arising courts and calendars, and they
advance the application of [other policy initiatives,
such as] the trial court performance standards and
the public trust and confidence initiative.6
Problem-solving courts—such as drug treatment courts,
mental health courts,7 and domestic violence courts8—may be
the most obvious examples of “therapeutic jurisprudence in
action,”9 but it is crucial to recognize the potential application
of therapeutic jurisprudence generally—in civil cases,10 appellate cases, 11 family law cases,12 and, of course, in criminal13 and
juvenile14cases. The importance of the therapeutic jurisprudence perspective beyond the specialized problem-solving
court context was underscored by a “vision statement” recently
agreed to by the District Court for Clark County, Washington.15
CRIMINAL LAW CONTEXT

In the criminal law context, the challenge for therapeutic
jurisprudence is multifaceted, and includes a concern not only
for defendants, but also for others drawn into the process, such
as victims16 and jurors.17 The remainder of this essay, however,
will focus on defendants and on the opportunity for courts to
contribute to offender rehabilitation and reform.

(2000).
11. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Appeal of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 228 (2000); Gerald W. VandeWalle, A Sea
Change in the Appellate Process?, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 567 (2000);
David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the Appellate Arena,
24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 217 (2000).
12. Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for
Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to Construct a Unified
Family Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 71 (1998).
13. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal
Courts, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 279 (1993), reprinted in LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
157 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996) (hereinafter
cited as KEY).
14. David B. Wexler, Just Some Juvenile Thinking About Delinquent
Behavior: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to Relapse
Prevention Planning and Youth Advisory Juries, 69 UMKC L. REV. 93
(2000).
15. District Court of the State of Washington for Clark County,
Division of District Court, approved May 18, 2001. Judge Randal
B. Fritzler, a leading judicial voice in therapeutic jurisprudence, is
a judge in that judicial district.
16. Richard P. Wiebe, The Mental Health Implications of Crime Victims
Rights, in KEY, supra note 13, at 213.
17. Daniel W. Shuman et al, The Health Effects of Jury Service, in KEY,
supra note 13, at 949.

Of course, judicial opportunity will be enhanced—but is by
no means dependent upon—the presence of a group of lawyers
practicing therapeutic jurisprudence.18 Such a bar is indeed
emerging.19
Dallas lawyer John McShane, for example, has a substantial
criminal law practice that “focuses solely on rehabilitation and
mitigation of punishment.”20 McShane is in private practice,
and he can pick and choose his clients. He chooses only those
who agree to use the crisis occasioned by the criminal case as
an opportunity to turn their lives around.
McShane seeks to defer disposition so as to allow the client
an opportunity for rehabilitation. The hope, of course, is that
the court will be impressed by, and take into account, such
post-offense rehabilitation efforts and gains.21
A packet of mitigating information is assembled and eventually submitted to the prosecutor in an effort at plea bargaining, or, failing that, to the court at sentencing. The packet consists of items such as “AA Meeting Attendance Logs, urinanalysis lab reports, reports of evaluating and treating mental
health professionals, and letters of support from various people in the community, such as AA sponsor, employer, co-workers, clergy, family, and friends.”22
This may be illustrative of the role of an excellent TJ defense
attorney, but what about the role of the judge? Apart from the
important legal niceties such as the possibility of deferred sentencing23 and the possibility of mitigating the sentence for
acceptance of responsibility24 and for post-offense rehabilitation, what guidance can therapeutic jurisprudence give to
judges interested in furthering offender rehabilitation?
Some of the most exciting therapeutic jurisprudence work
involves the crafting of creative proposals for importing
promising behavioral science developments—such as important research on rehabilitation—into the legal system and into
the day-to-day work of lawyers and judges. Such work also
offers an excellent opportunity for partnership between academia and the judiciary.
In other work, which I will only briefly summarize here, I
have explored how judges might use some basic principles to
increase offender compliance with conditions of
release.25Relatedly, I have explored how courts could encourage defendants to engage in relapse prevention planning.26

healthcare professionals and
The hearing can
deals with improving patient
adherence to medical advice. serve as a forum in
But many of its principles
which an insanity
seem readily transferable to
acquittee or
a legal setting.
criminal defendant
Some of the principles
are completely common
can make a public
sensical, such as speaking in
commitment to
simple terms.
Patients
comply.
sometimes may not comply
with medical advice because
they never really quite get the message.
Other principles are somewhat less obvious. For instance,
when patients sign “behavioral contracts”—agreeing to follow
certain medical protocols, for example—they are apparently
more likely to comply with medical advice than if such a contract is not entered into. If patients make some sort of public
commitment to comply, to persons above and beyond the
health care provider, their compliance is likely to increase.
Relatedly, if family members are aware of a patient’s promise,
the patient is again more likely to adhere to the agreed-upon
conditions.
Consider how these compliance principles might operate in
a legal context. If a judge is considering a petition for the conditional release of an insanity-acquitted offender, or if, at a sentencing hearing, a judge is deciding whether to grant probation, the court could conceptualize the conditional release not
simply as a judicial order but as a type of behavioral contract.
In addition, the hearing can serve as a forum in which an
insanity acquittee or criminal defendant can make a public
commitment to comply. Compliance should also be enhanced
by the presence at the hearing of agreed-upon family members.
There is much more to this, of course, and the interested reader
can consult the more detailed work.28 Let us now turn to the
related material on relapse prevention planning principles.
RELAPSE PREVENTION

The compliance project was inspired by a book titled
Facilitating Treatment Adherence: A Practitioner’s Guidebook.27
The book itself has nothing to do with law; it is addressed to

As with the compliance project, my interest in importing
relapse prevention planning into the legal arena was triggered
by a particular book, this time James McGuire’s anthology titled
What Works: Reducing Reoffending.29 The gist of McGuire’s book
is that certain rehabilitation techniques, known as the “cognitive behavioral” variety, seem particularly promising.
These programs are premised on the fact that offenders
often act rather impulsively. Accordingly, the programs are

18. PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING
PROFESSION (Dennis P. Stolle, David B. Wexler, & Bruce J. Winick,
eds., 2000) (hereinafter cited as PRACTICING TJ).
19. Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within the
Comprehensive Law Movement, in PRACTICING TJ at 465.
20. JOHN V. MCSHANE, THE HOW AND WHY OF THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE WORK (2000).
21. United States v. Flowers, 983 F. Supp. 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). See
generally Bruce J. Winick, Redefining the Role of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer at Plea Bargaining and Sentencing: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence/Preventive Law Model, in PRACTICING TJ, supra note
18, at 245.

22. MCSHANE, supra note 20, at 2.
23. See note 21 supra.
24. U.S. v. Jeter, 263 F.3d 1032 (2001).
25. David B. Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles and the
Insanity Acquittee Conditional Release Process, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 18
(1991).
26. David B. Wexler, Relapse Prevention Planning Principles for
Criminal Law Practice, in PRACTICING TJ, supra note 18, at 237.
27. DONALD MEICHENBAUM & DENNIS C. TURK, FACILITATING TREATMENT
ADHERENCE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDEBOOK (1987).
28. See note 25 supra.
29. WHAT WORKS: REDUCING REOFFENDING (James McGuire ed., 1995).
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geared to teaching offenders
certain
problem-solving
skills: to understand the
chain of events that often
leads to criminality, to anticipate high-risk situations,
and to learn to stop and
think so as to avoid highrisk situations or to adequately cope with such situations should they arise.
Once offenders develop
such an understanding,
they may prepare relapse
prevention plans. For example, “I realize that I am at highest
risk for criminal behavior when I party with Joe on Friday
nights. I will therefore stay home and rent a video on Friday
nights.”
An interesting therapeutic jurisprudence inquiry is to
explore how courts can encourage this “cognitive/behavioral”
rehabilitative effort as part of the legal process itself. My suggestion—again, developed more fully elsewhere30—is for the
court to place some real responsibility on the defendant (with
the assistance of counsel and others) to think through his or
her situation and vulnerabilities.
Thus, a judge about to consider a defendant for probation
might say, “I’m going to consider you but I want you to come
up with a type of preliminary plan that we will use as a basis
of discussion. I want you to figure out why I should grant you
probation and why I should feel comfortable that you’re going
to succeed. In order for me to feel comfortable, I need to know
what you regard to be high-risk situations and how you’re
going to avoid them or cope with them without messing up.
And, speaking of messing up, I want you to tell me what happened that led you to mess up last time, and why you think the
situation is different this time around.”
Under such an approach, a court would be promoting cognitive self-change as part and parcel of the sentencing process
itself. The process might operate this way: “I realize I mess up
on Friday nights, and from now on I will stay home on
Fridays.”
Note that this condition is not the product of judicial fiat.
Instead, the defendant has thought through a serious high-risk
situation and has in essence come up with his or her own condition of probation. The offender is thus likely to regard the
condition as fair and, linking back to our earlier discussion, is
probably more likely to comply with it than if it had simply
been externally imposed by the court.
According to the “what works” research, cognitive self-

Who decides to change course, and how and why, seem to be
questions locked away in what Shadd Maruna calls the “black
box”31 of the “what works” literature. Maruna’s book, Making
Good: How Ex-Convicts Reform and Rebuild Their Lives,32 published in 2001 by the American Psychological Association, is,
like Facilitating Treatment Adherence33 and What Works,34 a
meaty work chock full of therapeutic jurisprudential implications. In the remainder of this essay, I would like to explore
how Maruna’s findings might be relevant to judges—how, with
these insights, judges might help offenders “make good.”
Briefly, in his “Liverpool Desistance Study,” Maruna interviewed both “persistent” offenders and those who, after a
steady diet of criminal behavior, eventually become “desisters.”
His objective was to use a “narrative” approach—consistent
with the notion of “narrative therapy”35—to see how the two
offender types described and made sense of their lives.
Maruna’s principal contribution, of course, relates to the
“desisters.” These ex-convicts need to develop a “coherent,
prosocial identity,”36 and need an explanation for “how their
checkered past could have led to their new, reformed identities.”37 Presumably, these explanatory narratives are not
merely a result of desistance behavior, but should also be
understood as “factors that help to sustain desistance.”38
Maruna notes that there is much drifting and zigzagging in
and out of criminal activity.39 Accordingly, desistance is best
seen as a “maintenance process,”40 rather than as a specific
event.
Generally, a desister’s narrative establishes that the narrator’s “real self” is basically good; that the narrator became a victim of society who turned to crime and drugs to cope with a
bleak environment; that the narrator then became trapped in a
vicious cycle of repeated criminal activity and imprisonment;
that someone in conventional society believed in and recognized the potential of the narrator, thereby allowing him or her
to make good.41
But “reformation is not something that is visible or objective

30. See note 26 supra.
31. SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-INMATES REFORM AND
REBUILD THEIR LIVES 111 (2001) (hereinafter cited as MAKING
GOOD).
32. Id.
33. See note 27 supra.
34. See note 29 supra.
35. NARRATIVE THERAPY IN PRACTICE: THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF HOPE

(Gerald Monk, John Winslade, Kathy Crocket, and David Epstein
eds., 1997).
36. MAKING GOOD, supra note 31, at 7.
37. Id. at 8.
38. Id. at 42 (emphasis supplied).
39. Id. at 44.
40. Id. at 26.
41. Id. at 87.
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is for the court to
place some real
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the defendant . . .
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situation and
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change programs seem promising, but, of course, they do not
work for everyone. If an offender is committed to continued
offending, for example, even substantial exposure to a program
of problem-solving skills is simply not going to lead to desistance.
On the other hand, if an offender has a self-concept of being
a basically good person who often finds himself in a jam, or in
the wrong place at the wrong time, or mixing with the wrong
crowd, such a person may well decide he wants to straighten
out and take control of his life. For such a person, a cognitive
skills development program may well help change his course.
DESISTANCE

in the sense it can be ‘proven.’”42 It is a construct that is interactional in nature: desisting persons must in some way accept
conventional society and conventional society must in turn
accept them.43 Thus, their conversion “may remain suspect to
significant others, and most importantly to themselves.”44
Accordingly, the desisting interviewees in Maruna’s study
“seemed almost obsessed with establishing the authenticity of
their reform.”45 During the interviews, many provided supporting documents—letters from college teachers and from
parole officers, copies of offense records showing the date of
last conviction. Others urged the investigator to speak with
family members, girlfriends, or to the manager or receptionist
of a drug treatment clinic.46
Not surprisingly, “while the testimony of any conventional
other will do, the best certification of reform involves a public
or official endorsement from media outlets, community leaders, and members of the social control establishment.”47 In his
final chapter, Maruna undertakes an exercise that is essentially
a therapeutic jurisprudential one: he speaks of instituting and
institutionalizing redemption rituals. These include graduation ceremonies upon successful completion of correctional
programs,48 reentry courts “empowered not only to reimprison
each felon but also to officially recognize their efforts toward
reform,”49 and “rebiographing” clean ex-offenders through
officially recognized record expungement procedures.50

Two judicially related proposals mentioned by Maruna—
graduation ceremonies and reentry courts—are matters of considerable current interest.
In drug treatment courts, for example, applause is common,
and, in some courts, even judicial hugs are by no means a rare
occurrence.51 In Judge Judy Mitchell-Davis’s Chicago courtroom, “upon successful completion of a drug court sentence,
the offenders invite their friends and family to a graduation
ceremony in the courthouse.”52 Some of the graduates make
speeches, and all receive a “diploma” from the court.53 In some
such courts, “participants have asked that their arresting officer be present at their graduation.”54
These lessons from drug treatment courts can be extended,
of course, to other specialized treatment courts and to ordinary
juvenile and criminal cases. Judicial praise, family and friend

attendance, and graduaTwo judicially
tion ceremonies can all
related proposals
occur, for example, at the
successful completion of—
mentioned by
or early termination of—a
Maruna—
period
of
probation
graduation
imposed in a “routine”
criminal case.
ceremonies and
Such a ceremony would
reentry courts—
acknowledge a former
are matters of
offender’s progress and,
taking a page from
considerable
Maruna, may, at the same
current interest.
time, itself contribute to the
maintenance of desisting
behavior. The strong suggestion that these ceremonies are
themselves therapeutic, and are therefore not merely “ceremonial,” might readily justify their widespread use. Relatedly, if
they seem themselves to contribute to reduced recidivism, that
crucially important societal benefit could easily justify their
time-consuming nature.
Besides graduation ceremonies, Maruna endorses the notion
of reentry courts “empowered not only to reimprison each felon
but also to officially recognize their efforts toward reform.”55
The apparent success of drug treatment courts, based on a team
approach and ongoing judge-defendant interaction, has led to
proposals for importing the model to the prisoner reentry
process.56
Reentry courts could tap many principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence, and could serve a very important function. The
problem, however, is that, at least in the United States, “in
most jurisdictions, the authority for reentry issues is not
within the judicial branch.”57
Nonetheless, the function Maruna would like to see
served—official recognition of efforts toward reform—can be
performed by courts in at least some contexts. For example,
unlike adult criminal courts, juvenile courts do typically retain
a post-dispositional review authority, and such courts can in
effect serve a major reentry function.58
The main lesson, of course, is that review hearings—for
juveniles, for probationers, for conditionally released insanity
acquittees—need not only be meaningful if one is to be “vio-

42. Id. at 158.
43. Id. at 155.
44. Id. at 158.
45. Id. at 156.
46. Id. at 157.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 162.
49. Id. at 164.
50. Id. at 164-65.
51. Adam W. Lasker, Her Stock in Trade Is “Therapeutic Jurisprudence,”
CHICAGO DLY. L. BULL., June 13, 2001.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Deborah J. Chase & Peggy Fulton Hora, The Implications of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence for Judicial Satisfaction, COURT REVIEW,
Spring 2000 at 12.

55. MAKING GOOD, supra note 31, at 164.
56. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, REENTRY COURTS: MANAGING THE
TRANSITION FROM PRISON TO COMMUNITY (Sept. 1999).
57. Id. at 7. In Italy, judicial authority does exist, although that authority has typically been exercised in a very traditional, legalistic manner. American jurisprudence might profit from looking comparatively at legal structures that provide for ongoing judicial monitoring. Similarly, the Italian legal system, where the legal structure is
in place, might profit from the American experience with therapeutic jurisprudence, specialized treatment courts, and the like. Such
is the thrust of a recent article in an Italian criminology journal. S.
Ciappi, D. Wexler, F. Agrait, & G.B. Traverso, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence. Alcune considerazioni su di una concezione postliberale
del dirotto e della pena, 6 RASSEGNA ITALIANA DI CRIMINOLOGIA 1
(2001).
58. Wexler, supra note 14, at 97.
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lated” and there is a real threat
of revocation. Such hearings
can and should also be meaningful—and not just routine
and perfunctory—when all is
going well. In many legal settings, courts have the discretion to set review hearings at
intervals shorter than those
mandated by law. Judges
should consider taking such
action even when they are not
especially worried about an offender’s compliance, for such a
hearing could indeed recognize and applaud an offender’s
efforts and itself contribute to the maintenance of desistance.
Recall that desistance is best thought of as a “maintenance
process.”59 And recall that desisters—especially at the early
stages of desistance—desperately need outside validation to
convince themselves of their conversion.
The judge, of course, is the perfect prestigious person to
confer public and official validation on the offender and the
offender’s reform efforts. Ideally, at a deferred sentencing hearing or at an “all is going well” review hearing, the judge also
can comment favorably upon the sorts of matters that Maruna
found to be so important to desisting offenders: impressive
meeting attendance logs, for example, and letters from or the
occasional live testimony of members of conventional society:
college teacher, probation or parole officer, mother, girlfriend,
manager and receptionist at the drug clinic, and the like.
When all goes well, of course, it is relatively easy for the
judge to constitute the respected member of conventional society willing to “believe in”60 the defendant and to see the defendant’s “real me”61—the diamond in the rough.62 But all does
not always go well. Review hearings will often be rather
“mixed,” and sometimes they will require revocation.
Sentencing hearings will not invariably lead to probationary
dispositions. Often, judicial discretion regarding disposition
will be severely circumscribed.
Even in these far from favorable situations, the court can
play a highly important—albeit a more long-range—role in
potential offender reform. Consider the “vision statement” of
the District Court of Clark County, Washington.63 That vision
specifically embraces the use of principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence to “make a positive change in the lives of people
who come before the court.”64
Some of the vision statement’s “guiding values” relate
remarkably well to Maruna’s findings regarding desister narratives. One guiding value, for example, is that “individuals are
not condemned to a life of crime or despair by mental condition or substance abuse and that everyone can achieve a fulfilling and responsible life.”65 Another is the belief that “every-

one, no matter whom, has something positive within their
make up that can be built upon.”66
A judge committed to this vision will not regard these guiding values as mere fluff. Such a judge, for example, is unlikely
to tell a woman that she is simply “no good as a mother.”67
And, even when imposing a severe sentence, such a judge is
not going to say, “You are a menace and a danger to society.
Society should be protected from the likes of you.”68
Instead, especially in light of Maruna’s findings, a judge
committed to the vision statement should search for and comment on whatever favorable features might eventually be
woven together by the offender to constitute the “real me” or
the “diamond in the rough.” Sometimes, such a favorable feature might mitigate the sentence. If the judge takes the pains
to emphasize it as a real quality—not simply as a mechanical
mitigating factor—it may eventually constitute a meaningful
component of the offender’s self-identify. Such a judge might
say something like this:
You and your friends were involved in some pretty
serious business here, and I am going to impose a
sentence that reflects just how serious it is. I want
to add one thing, however. There’s been some testimony here about how you showed some real concern for the victim. I’m going to take that into consideration in your case. You know, according to
some of the letters that were submitted, it looks like
that sensitive nature is something you displayed
way back in grade school Nowadays, it seems to
peek out only now and then. But if I could peel
away a few layers, I’ll bet I could get a glimpse of a
pretty caring person way down there. In any case,
under the law in this state, I’m able to reduce your
sentence by a year for what you did when that caring quality came peeking out last March.

59. MAKING GOOD, supra note 31, at 26.
60. Id. at 87.
61. Id. at 88.
62. Id. at 95.
63. See note 15 supra.

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See MAKING GOOD, supra note 31, at 88.
68. See id. at 158.
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Sometimes, a search for and discovery of a favorable feature
or quality may not influence the disposition at all, but it may
nonetheless plant a helpful seed, like this:
I don’t really know what went wrong here. I do
know you committed a robbery and someone was
hurt. And I know that it is only right that I impose
a sentence of such-and-such. What I don’t understand is why this all happened. You are obviously
very intelligent and were always a good student.
Your former wife says that, until a few years ago,
you were a very good, caring, and responsible
father. You obviously have a real talent for woodworking, but it’s been years since you spent time on
a real woodworking project. Beneath all this, I see a
good person who has gotten on the wrong path. I
hope you’ll think about this and change that path.

With your intelligence, personality, and talent, I
think you can do it if you decide you really want to.
CONCLUSION

Even if the sentence imposed is unaffected, following this
process is likely to be worth the judicial effort. Maruna notes
that both narrative development and desistance each constitute
ongoing processes. In rewriting the narratives of their lives,
desisting offenders often look to instances in their pasts when
their “real” selves shone and when respected members of conventional society recognized their talents and good qualities.
Thus, even in instances where desistance seems not to have
occurred, judges can use principles of therapeutic jurisprudence in the hope that their judicial behavior may constitute
the building blocks of eventual reform and rehabilitation. This
sort of judging may therefore have both short-term and longterm benefits. Ultimately, the benefits may be for offenders,
and, in turn, for society as a whole.
And let’s not forget the benefits to the judges, whose sense
of professional satisfaction may soar.69 Who would not feel
immense satisfaction receiving letters, as Chicago drug treatment court Judge Judy Mitchell-Davis (dubbed “Judge Judy”
by defendants) often does, like this one?:

Judge Judy, I just want to thank you for being the
loving and caring woman that you are. You’ve really
helped make a positive change in my life. I believe
I’m going to make it. It feels so amazing to control
my own thoughts and feelings. I feel so good about
myself for the first time.70
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